Restructuring the Skies: The Post-pandemic Shift in Argentine Aviation Labour Relations

The airline industry has only just recovered from its most severe crisis in history: the COVID-19 pandemic. The year 2023 saw a robust revival across the entire industry globally (IATA, 2024). However, the International Labour Organization (ILO) highlights two critical challenges during this recovery phase. First, there is a significant knowledge gap resulting from the loss of highly qualified and experienced workers who were made redundant or took early retirement in 2020. Second, the industry faces difficulties in hiring and retaining staff due to the “great resignation”, with many workers migrating to other sectors. As air travel demand rebounds (ILO, 2023), these challenges persist, driven by factors that extend beyond the pandemic alone. 

Long before the outbreak, cabin crew workers were facing increasing labour intensification and precarious employment conditions (Gillet, A. & Tremblay, 2021). Together with Anne Engelhardt, I conceptualized this global process of undermining working conditions as “Ryanairization” — a global trend characterized by the pursuit of higher productivity at the expense of workers’ health (Cufré & Engelhardt, 2024). In this text, I will focus on the case of Argentina to illustrate how the reconfiguration of the aviation industry has emerged from these undermined working conditions. My main argument is that LATAM’s cessation of operations in 2020, and the aftermath of the resulting labour conflict, widened the gap between the labour models of low-cost carriers and traditional airlines. For cabin crew workers in particular, the sectorial restructuring following LATAM Airways’ departure and the changes in the aeronautical regulations in 2021 marked a shift in labour relations and working standards.

LATAM’s Exit and Argentina’s Labour Landscape

The suspension of commercial flights to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus began in March 2020 and lasted until November. When operations resumed, three airlines — Avianca, Andes, and LATAM — did not return to the domestic Argentinian market. However, their problems predated the pandemic. The so-called “Airplane Revolution”, a tariff deregulation and market liberalization policy implemented in 2016, created a sectorial crisis that was later accelerated by the pandemic’s flight suspensions and economic losses. Between 2013 and 2019, LATAM Holding had already reduced staff across Latin America, including in Argentina, with the closure of the local call centre in 2017 being its most significant conflict. 

In April 2020, LATAM announced cease the suspension of its domestic operations within Argentina, though its international flights remained unaffected. The case gained significant media attention due to worker mobilizations, despite strict lockdown policies. Before the pandemic, LATAM Airways had the largest presence among private airlines in the domestic market. In January 2020, the distribution of the Argentinean airline market was as follows: LATAM accounted for 16.4 per cent, Aerolíneas Argentinas and Austral together dominated with 59.1 per cent, Flybondi held 9 per cent, Norwegian and Jetsmart each had 7.1 per cent, Andes represented 1 per cent, and other operators contributed 0.3 per cent (ANAC, 2020). As of January 2024, Aerolíneas Argentinas & Austral (now one merged company) continue to dominate the market with 68 per cent, followed by low-cost carriers Flybondi with 19 per cent and Jetsmart with 11 per cent. Other airlines account for the remaining 2 per cent (ANAC, 2024).

The current landscape is divided between two business and labour models: low-cost carriers and traditional airlines. LATAM’s disappearance was crucial for this alteration in the composition of the domestic market. Most importantly, the mass dismissal of workers reversed years of gradual progress made by LATAM’s cabin crew in improving working conditions and organizing labour. Moreover, the airline’s departure from the Argentinean market left behind a legacy of anti-union policies and individualized labour relations central to Javier Milei’s liberal aviation model today. Understanding the company’s history is essential to fully comprehending this process.

LATAM Airways, the Latin American giant, was established in 2012 with the merger of LAN (Linea Aérea Nacional de Chile) and TAM (Taxi Aéreo Marília, Brazil). However, the expansion began as early as 2000, with the airline acquiring companies that were nearly bankrupt or had severe financial deficits in countries like Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia. Workers were rehired after these acquisitions, but then lost their seniority, labour conditions, collective agreements, and, in some cases, their union representation (ITF, 2012). In 2005, LAN Chile created a separate subsidiary airline in Argentina by acquiring the routes and operational licences from LAFSA. This state-owned company had never actually operated but had absorbed staff from other failed airlines like LAPA, Dinar, and Southern Wings. This move aligned with LAN’s broader regional strategy, facilitated by an agreement with the government of Néstor Kirchner (2003–2007), who in turn found a solution for LAFSA. A vital element of that process was the exclusion of cabin crew workers from representation by Asociación Argentina de Aeronavegantes (AAA), the industry union. Instead, workers were made to join the Asociación de Tripulantes de Cabina de Pasajeros Argentinos (ATCPEA), a union for LAN workers that could not sign collective agreements. Many of LAN Chile’s existing staff were not transferred to the newly established LAN Argentina subsidiary as initially promised; rather, they were asked to reapply for their positions, losing their previous seniority. They were also forced to affiliate with ATCPEA, especially those who had been active members of AAA (Feller & Conrow, 2017: 11–13).

This history is important for understanding the conflict during the pandemic for several reasons. First, LATAM’s entry into the Argentinean market in 2005 gave the company a privileged position, marking a significant triumph in its regional corporate strategy. As workers put it, the company was able to establish its own system: “the Republic of LATAM” (Cufré & Miguel, 2021). Based on the principles of extortion and a solid anti-union policy, it managed to skip the traditional industrial relations framework. It took a decade of intense activist work to massively affiliate LATAM workers to AAA, and to sign a collective agreement that levelled up working standards in 2015. This lengthy process cultivated a new generation of activists and union representatives who later led the resistance in the conflict during the COVID-19 crisis.

LATAM announced a 50 per cent salary cut in April 2020. On 17 June, the company issued a press release stating that it would cease domestic operations in Argentina, while maintaining international routes. The choice of wording here is crucial: “cease” did not imply that the company would close or declare bankruptcy, nor did it mean that workers were technically dismissed. According to regulations on sanitary emergencies, layoffs were prohibited, although this did not prevent employers from firing workers in different sectors. Cabin crew workers resisted the pressure to sign retirement agreements and collectively organized, combining street demonstrations and a strong communication campaign, which I will detail later. These actions were organized by AAA delegates within LATAM and some cabin crew workers who formed the group Comunidad Tripulantes (Cabin Crew Community). This group set itself apart from the union leadership. With other aviation workers, such as technicians and pilots, they converged under the banner of Trabajadores de LATAM en Lucha (LATAM Workers in Struggle). The trajectories of workers who engaged in these two groups differed: some were union delegates or former delegates, others had never participated in unions or political organizations, and others were activists from left-wing political parties. As mentioned earlier, the AAA delegates in LATAM had been active in moving from the company union (ATCPEA) to the industry union (AAA), which resulted in the signing of the collective agreement in 2015.

LATAM management successfully pressured workers into signing voluntary agreements, with 1,522 out of 1,715 workers accepting them before the dismissals began in February 2021 (Comunidad Tripulantes, 8 February 2021). Those who had not agreed, including delegates in the union’s opposition faction, were ultimately fired. This dismissal primarily targeted women and feminist unionists, consolidating the union leadership position within AAA. The uncertainty brought about by the pandemic, together with months of company-driven harassment, layoffs, and shifting power dynamics within the cabin crew union, created fertile ground for the imposition of changes to labour regulations during the pandemic recovery. 

The Pandemic Aftermath: Fragmentation and Labour Intensification

Once LATAM was out of the game, AAA’s representation became limited to the workers of the state-owned flagship airline Aerolíneas Argentinas (AR), which recognises industry unions for collective bargaining. In contrast, the two low-cost competitors, Flybondi and Jetsmart, operate under a company-level union model with lower working standards. The Argentinean industrial relations framework comprises sectorial union organizations for collective bargaining, but this is not universal. Historical struggles have resulted in various institutionalized forms of labour rights advocacy, such as the case of Buenos Aires underground service workers who organized at the company level in opposition to the transport union leadership. In the aviation sector, industry unions used to negotiate the Collective Labour Agreements (CLAs) in each airline separately, tailored to the company’s size and market share, as a charter company with two planes cannot be compared with the national carrier. However, the standards of the larger companies tended to level up negotiations in the smaller ones.

Thus, LATAM’s exit from the domestic market consolidated the gap between low-cost carriers and traditional airlines, shifting the industry towards a company-based union model. This process marked one of the new features of the post-pandemic recovery phase. Another key development was the changes in aviation regulation aimed at increasing cabin crew productivity. To understand the impact of such transformations, some distinctive components of the industry’s international standards need to be clarified.

In aviation, tasks and working times are regulated in accordance with international safety standards. Collective agreements are based on national regulations that follow the international standards established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). ICAO, a specialized UN agency founded in 1944, was created to establish a common framework for the industry as it transitioned from military to commercial operations. IATA, formed in 1945, is a global trade association for airlines, representing around 300 airlines worldwide. It plays a crucial role in setting industry standards, including developing safety protocols and regulatory frameworks.

Those standards are implemented in each country through national regulations — and in compliance with other supranational structures in the case of the European Union — meaning that airlines have to meet those regulations in order to operate. Collective bargaining processes are based on these frameworks and labour laws. Due to this structure, changes in national regulations directly impact overall working conditions. Moreover, airlines can operate based on these national general regulations without going through a collective bargaining process with the unions. Among workers, this is called volar resolución (flying by resolution), in reference to the normative tool. This approach was common in the 1990s for cabin crews from companies like Dinar, Lapa, and Southern Wings, and LATAM adopted a similar model in 2005, using individual agreements based on national regulations. Flybondi, Norwegian, and Jetsmart recently did the same when they arrived in the local market after 2017. 

In October 2020, when commercial flights gradually resumed, the National Civil Aviation Administration (ANAC) published a project to modify the regulations, establishing maximum and minimum working hours and rest times for flight crews. The aviation community had ten working days to submit comments. This included the LATAM delegates, who had yet to be dismissed and were still demanding a response from the Ministry of Labour and the national executive to LATAM’s closure policy. 

Cabin crew workers and the LATAM union delegates objected to the modifications in the draft, both conceptually and with regards to the specific articles, which they argued would degrade working conditions. At the conceptual level, they pointed out the oversimplification of the definition of the word fatigue, understood only as a “lack of sleep”. Finally, the decree incorporated a concept that aligned more with international standards and scientific research and directly associated fatigue with the impact on wakefulness, circadian rhythms, and workload. Nonetheless, workers were excluded from the fatigue management system as in the original draft. In other words, decisions on occupational health were left to the airlines. Their second concern was reduced resting times and extended flight and flight duty times. 

The new legislation enshrined the framework for the post-pandemic recovery phase through a decree in December 2021 (879/2021), ten months after the dismissal of LATAM workers and union delegates who had strongly opposed it. Some of the most relevant modifications include a reduction of one hour in night-time rest, changes in the calculations for post-service rest, and increased margins to extend working times. This means that airlines operating in the country can now schedule longer hours, provided they add one cabin crew member with a reserved seat to take a break. In those cases, the flight time (from takeoff to landing) can be increased from a maximum of nine to 11 hours, and the flight duty time (which includes tasks performed before and after the flight) from 13 to 15 hours. Moreover, that seat for the additional crew member undermines the definition of “rest facilities on board”, which should refer to a space reserved for that purpose and not a place shared with passengers with the possibility of such rest being interrupted. 

Although this did not automatically increase working hours, it opened the door to increased fatigue and an intensified workload, which pushed for a lowering of working standards. It also validated what, in practice, all companies try to impose: interpretations in favour of extending working hours, reducing rest breaks and thereby increasing crew fatigue. It is important to note here that fatigue levels are one of the main risks in the aviation industry, as they can lead to errors or omissions in safety procedures that put workers and passengers at risk. As an example, fatigue can lead to overlooking aircraft alerts or failing to respond clearly in the event of having to evacuate an aircraft with people on board. Thus, degrading working conditions always involves a risk in terms of safety and security, and this has been the core of the aviation union struggle’s tradition in the sector (Cufré, 2019).

Labouring Bodies in a Post-Pandemic Industry

Increasing daily, weekly, and monthly working hours can enhance productivity. Following a low-cost model, this can be achieved by scheduling more flights with the same crew within a working day. This approach has profound consequences for workers. The greater the number of departures and landings planned in a single working day, the greater the pressure experienced by cabin crew, leading to various physical effects such as swollen legs, muscle aches, and physical exhaustion that affects sleep. This is the case even on domestic flights without time zone changes. So, increasing the maximum flight and service times intensifies such processes, even if an extra person is added. Those multiple experiences and the emotional labour workload related to passenger handling tend to be overlooked in mainstream occupational health discussions. While studies in airline medicine and psychology have long examined the impacts of fatigue, they typically focus on diagnosable occupational effects, symptoms, or diseases. 

The transformations in labour standards extend far beyond recognized occupational diseases. Drawing from critical health perspectives, I understand the “health-illness processes” (Laurell, 1993) as complex experiences shaped by workers’ interactions with their own bodies, which are socially and historically produced. Taking from Social Reproduction Theory (Rioux, 2015), I use the concept of the “labouring body” to understand how corporeality emerges within the interconnected realms of production and social reproduction. 

The body exists both in the workplace and at home, and the processes affecting it cannot be separated. The foot pain and the exhaustion of dealing with sexual harassment at work are intertwined with the tiredness of taking care of family or planning meals to have something to eat after returning from a flight. The mental burden of dealing simultaneously with tasks at home, work, and the union comprises a triple burden that does not occur in a vacuum, but in a specific social context. The constraints of the labour market, such as unemployment rates, affect our perceptions of what constitutes a “healthy” working environment. Similarly, collective organization and labour struggles are vital to revising those boundaries and fighting for better working and living conditions. In the case of cabin crew workers, the struggle for fair working hours is also a struggle for the right to sleep well at home and to have free leisure time. The processes of worker organization, their demands, and their achievements contribute to the shaping of their corporeal experiences. In this sense, the contestation is inherently collective, rather than individual. Not surprisingly, companies push for individualizing labour relations and fragmenting workers’ organizations. 

The increasing of cabin crew working hours is a global trend that enables airlines to schedule more flights per working day with the same crew. This is the basis of the low-cost model, which seeks to perform as many operations as possible with the same aircraft and crew with as little ground time as possible. Combined with a labour policy that emphasizes precarious hiring and low wages, this model places constant pressure on employees to drive on-board sales, resulting in high staff turnover rates. These airlines are betting on hiring younger people who can withstand such intensity and quit to be replaced by new ones. 

This is the “Ryanairization” process that is gaining traction globally during the post-pandemic recovery phase. In Argentina, it is characterized by a transformation in labour relations derived from the expansion of the low-cost model and a shift to in-company negotiations, accompanied by a general erosion of working standards due to new legislation.

Closing Remarks: A Platform for Today’s Total Liberalization

The aviation industry’s recovery post-COVID-19 has been marked by deteriorating working conditions, a trend that has worsened in recent years. The pandemic’s aftermath in Argentina set the conditions for today’s total liberalization policy.

The withdrawal of LATAM Airways from the local market was a turning point, exacerbating the fragmentation of the labour market between low-cost and full-service airlines and their respective labour relations models. While collective bargaining has traditionally occurred at the company level in conjunction with national industry unions, the standard set by larger companies like LATAM and AR often influenced negotiations in smaller ones. This dynamic is now being challenged as the low-cost model’s emphasis on increased productivity — characterized by longer working hours and heavier workloads — expands to AR, the only remaining full-service company.

This shift represents a gradual de facto transition from the traditional by-industry labour relations model to an in-company one with fragmented union representation. This has weakened the institutional scope of unions while strengthening a conservative leadership in AAA, as the collective of workers led by women and feminist union activists was removed from the intra-union dispute. Additionally, changes in aviation legislation in December 2021 regarding the calculation of crew working and resting hours have reinforced the trend toward labour intensification. Thus, the inability of Mauricio Macri’s right-wing government to reform aviation labour regulations in the years immediately before the outbreak of the COVID-19 crisis was effectively perpetuated during Alberto Fernández’s progressive presidency (2019-2023). 

The current government’s aero-commercial policy, which aims for total liberalization, builds upon this restructuring of labour relations in the Argentinean aeronautical sector that began before the pandemic. With a far-right party in power and its attempts at substantial labour reform, the total liberalization of the aviation internal market (open skies policies) and the privatization of the public airline pose significant threats to labour conditions in aviation and across all sectors.

The aviation market liberalization initiated by Javier Milei’s government further consolidates the low-cost labour relations model. The deregulation undertaken with the approval of the Ley Bases bill in June 2024 represents a significant advancement in labour precarity, as the process of labour intensification is exacerbated by market liberalization. Airlines can leverage the new legislation to increase productivity at the expense of wearing down cabin crew labouring bodies. They can also rely on the “flying resolution” scheme to bypass collective bargaining and branch union recognition. Moreover, the new Aeronautical Code permits the employment of local or foreign crews who may not be based in Argentina and may not be covered by local labour laws.

Despite this bleak outlook, one thing remains clear: workers, with their knowledge, identities, traditions of struggle, and desires for better lives, are the only ones who can keep planes and airports running. This is a boundary that no corporate policy or authoritarian regime can breach, and it serves as the foundation for envisioning a transformative future.

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Sources

ANAC, “Statistics, January 2020”, 17 February 2020, https://datos.anac.gob.ar/estadisticas/article/7046c8af-3c10-4ad8-9880-e6b0bfc7ba2f 

ANAC, “Administración Nacional de Aviación Civil, Statistics, January 2024”, 2 February 2024, https://datos.anac.gob.ar/estadisticas/article/d7c1f9b7-3e6c-43cf-8fb6-79cba2e9d517 

Comunidad Tripulantes, “DECLARACIÓN PÚBLICA. Compartimos información del CONFLICTO LATAM al día de hoy”, 8 February 2021, Twitter post, https://twitter.com/TcpsLatam/status/1358924679810064385/photo/1 

IATA, “Air Passenger Market Analysis. Industry Passenger Traffic Maintains an Upward Trend”, March 2024, https://www.iata.org/en/iata-repository/publications/economic-reports/air-passenger-market-analysis-march-2024/ 

International Labour Organization (ILO), “Towards a Green, Sustainable, and Inclusive Recovery for the Civil Aviation Sector: Report for the Technical Meeting on a Green, Sustainable, and Inclusive Economic Recovery for the Civil Aviation Sector”, 22 March 2023, https://www.ilo.org/publications/towards-green-sustainable-and-inclusive-recovery-civil-aviation-sector 

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