Right-Wing Feminists

Paülah: In the research that resulted in the book, you worked with women of different social and political backgrounds whom you grouped under the category of "feminists of the new right." Who are these women, and why did you choose these categories to name them?

Melina: We did not enter the field with any of these concepts: neither “feminists” nor “the new right”. The research itself led us to the category of liberal feminism, which became a central theme. What surprised us most was not so much that these women differed from left-wing feminism, but that they actively embraced the category of feminism to define themselves.

Existing literature on the political right in Latin America had already established a long history of women's presence and activism rooted in economic liberalism. But we had not found women from that ideological spectrum who self-identified as “feminists”. This appropriation deeply unsettled us, and we decided to explore it.

It is worth noting that [libertarian] liberal feminism does not encompass the entire spectrum of right-wing women; there are also those who do not organise based on gender, as well those who adopt anti-feminist narratives, conservatives, religious women, nationalists, and so on. In the book, we focus on “liberals” precisely to see the reach of this political millennial culture, appealing to sectors as diverse as young women, working-class women, and middle-class women.

"Liberal feminism" became a broader sensibility that took on new political meaning and allowed them to distinguish themselves from both progressive and conservative women.

Yet, beyond being a political category, liberal feminism became a broader sensibility that took on new political meaning and allowed them to distinguish themselves from both progressive and conservative women. This fostered a tone, a set of gestures, and a way of interpreting inequalities they experience as women involved in politics. Many images, phrases and references emerged that were familiar to us from other feminist spaces with different theoretical frameworks.

In the book you talk about the three generations of right-wing women you identified in your fieldwork and the relationships between them. Could you describe them?

Carolina: The three generations of women we researched defy stereotypes. The first generation comprises liberal women in their sixties. They are upper-class, which is evident in their appearance, speech, schooling, their flats and the neighbourhoods where they welcomed us. Most live in the countryside and were raised to be housewives. These women feel rebellious because they defied family expectations: they did not stay home to care for their families or men´s wealth. Yet when asked if they are feminists, they reply: "I am feminine, not a feminist". The public conversation sparked by the mass mobilization of feminism in 2015 did not appeal to them as it did to younger women, but considering their class, generation, and gender, their self-perception as rebellious is coherent.

Melina: The second generation described in the book comprises women who are around 30 or 40 years old. Unlike the first group, they do not come from aristocratic families; instead, they work for a living. Here we see an interesting transformation regarding who makes up the right wing at different historical moments. Although they would not describe themselves as right-wing, they do say that they are anti-leftist and align with political forces on the far right.

Carolina: These women attended public universities and many are now professors there. This generation was strongly influenced by the public debate on feminism and the Ni Una Menos movement. They told us how, at that time, they began to gather with other women, including progressive ones. An important aspect in the middle generation and among young women is the politicisation of abortion between 2015 and 2019. They remember that moment of intense debate, when they began to attend feminist demonstrations with enthusiasm and, increasingly, encountered left-wing slogans alongside strictly feminist claims, which created a very strong disconnect for them.

"I can support a march against violence towards women, but that doesn't mean I support Palestine or the struggles of pensioners and teachers against Milei."

Melina: As feminist and leftist agendas began to overlap, these women drifted apart. Everything that makes sense on the progressive-left side in terms of articulating forces and coordinating struggles generates increasing detachment on the other side. Interiewees often told us: "I can support a march against violence towards women, but that doesn't mean I support Palestine or the struggles of pensioners and teachers against Milei." They propose segmenting the struggles which the progressive camp seeks to coordinate.

Carolina: Regarding this second generation, many support legal abortion and LGBT rights. Even older women who did not fight for abortion do not agree that a woman should go to prison for having an abortion, unlike many prominent male libertarians. There is something about that public feminist sensibility that touched them and created a new openness towards abortion for all these women.

Furthermore, that political moment shaped the relationship between women of different generations. One of the older liberal women told us: "My daughter studies communication at the public university, she is a “green scarf girl” [in reference to the scarf that identifies the pro-legalization movement] and vegan, and I had to change things in order to get along with her."

Melina: And the third generation is the youngest one, who turned to liberalism after the first abortion debate in 2018 and 2019 and, above all, in 2020 with the pandemic. Most call themselves feminists and arrive at liberalism through Milei. The pandemic is the moment when [libertarian] liberalism became mainstream, because these young women are all affected by the working conditions of their generation, defined by absolute precariousness.

They struggle to pay for university or rent, often working as telemarketers or in delivery services. By reconstructing the history of women, we trace transformations in the social structure and in how young people’s relationship with work and right-wing agendas evolves over time. It is the youngest women who came of age during the pandemic and embraced the anti-state narrative. Unlike the first generation, who engage in politics to preserve existing wealth, these women mobilise for survival.

Carolina: It is important to understand the local development of global trends. For instance, colleagues in Paris tell us that right-wing feminism there are associated with anti-Islamic and anti-immigration agendas. But in Argentina, inflation and the economy dominate everything. These youngest women grew up in the heat of the pandemic crisis, with 50% of the country in informal employment, and their narrative is constructed around that.

Following this conceptual reconstruction, beyond the oppositional stances of these young feminists, what motivates them to organise? What are the objectives of their groups?

Carolina: What we saw was that all the women have prior experience participating in liberal spaces, like reading groups and political meetings, which are predominantly male. They note a “a lack of women in liberalism", and so they get together with other women to gain strength and feel more comfortable.

One woman told us about her experience in reading groups with young liberals in 2018 in her small town. While everyone talked about economics or finance, she wanted to bring up other issues such as abortion but found no echo. So she created a space for liberal women to discuss feminism.

These women want to talk about the economy, both the young and middle generation woman. They criticise men, and they want to be able to discuss with them on equal terms rather than being relegated to feminised spaces.

This interviewee says she is not a feminist, but she is grateful to the movement for giving her the words to understand that what was happening to her was not individual, but a shared realities. Thus, these women gather to talk about issues neglected by men. Still, they continue to debate with men in general spaces while maintaining their own forums for common ground.

Melina: This brings to mind Ofelia Fernández [a young feminist congresswoman for the Peronist Party] when she said: "I don't want to be invited to a table to talk about feminism. I want to be invited to talk about the economy." These women want to talk about the economy, both the young and middle generation woman. They criticise men, and they want to be able to discuss with them on equal terms rather than being relegated to feminised spaces.

Just as there are self-defence workshops, there are workshops for entrepreneurs and for finances literacy. However, this is not about investing in cryptocurrencies; it is a much more down-to-earth. They ask “where should I put the little money I have left? What percentage of my income do I spend on rent? Can I afford to start a business selling clothes on Instagram?” While there are success stories of millionaire CEOs, these women are not thinking about that. Instead, they are using business discourse as a means of survival.

Carolina: These women want to manage their money to avoid dependency on a father or husband, which are historical feminist principles. We have to understand that for these women, capitalism makes sense as a system, it is viewed as an ally because it has allowed them to earn their own salary. For them, capitalism is what made it possible to keep their earnings rather than surrendering them to male figures.

To recap some of the more conceptual issues mentioned: younger and middle- generation women discuss gender violence and sexism, but they do not talk about patriarchy. How do they interpret structural inequalities?

Melina: Talking about patriarchy would mean accepting an interpretation that links gender inequality to a critique of capitalism. Instead, they place themselves in a liberal tradition that associates women's struggle with the conquest of civil rights, individual autonomy and the vindication of historical figures such as suffragettes.

Carolina: In these narratives, inequality is not presented as an external structure, but as an internal obstacle that each woman must overcome. In this way, overcoming subordination becomes a matter of personal effort, self-awareness, or self-improvement—rooted in individual consciousness rather than collective transformation.

A recurring topic is that women lack the skills to speak in public, negotiate salaries, or argue with men. A well-known liberal contemporary feminist speaker addresses this very issue: she gives public speaking courses and promotes them with phrases such as: "so you can speak at work meetings", "so your boss will listen to you when you ask for a promotion", "so you can discuss the unequal distribution of domestic labour with your partner", or even "so you can get married and, if you separate, you won't end up on the street".

These messages combine elements of coaching, liberalism and a certain feminist sensibility. There is a critique of how women have been socialised—as subjects unprepared to navigate public life—but the response is individual rather than political. At the same time, they do not constitute a fixed or strictly individualistic subject: These women travel, build networks, back each other, and are active and connected in different provinces.

One of the central ideas in these women’s narratives, as you point out in the book, is merit based on effort. Why is it so important for them to earn success at a time when men seem to be abandoning that rhetoric in favour of one focused on shortcuts, trickery, or getting ahead by any means?

Carolina: The women we researched see themselves as part of a project that values effort, dedication, and preparation. They differ from certain media figures of liberalism, with whom they do not identify. They say: "We are educated, we are activists, we read, and yet we end up being relegated while the media spotlights prettyfools figures." They are uncomfortable with these women being the visible faces of libertarianism because they feel that they embody a "more serious" liberalism.

For them, being educated is a form of political legitimisation. These women read, debate, organise study groups, educate themselves, and construct arguments. They believe that this symbolic and cognitive capital is what will propel them forward in politics and economics.

In such an adverse context, how do they envision achieving their goals? What strategies do they develop?

Carolina: Like us, they strategise by competing for positions in the parties and the government; crafting political agendas; drafting legislation. The practices are familiar. For example, a few months ago they presented a bill on financial education, and they are organising to influence electoral lists, aiming to be at the top rather than the bottom.

Melina: Many of their agendas mirror those of left-wing feminism. For example, when a gender parity bill was presented to the Supreme Court of Justice, liberal women joined forces within various activities with those on the progressive spectrum.

Today's right wing not only includes women; it shapes, challenges, and provides them with spaces and a political language.

Carolina: However, they participate less in street protests. Not only because their mode of organisation is different, but also because they are very critical of occupying public spaces, and especially of acts like defacing cathedrals or spraying graffiti. If they do attend an event, they think about how they are going to clean up afterwards to avoid burdening the state with restoration costs. But they also don’t march because they are not welcome. One of them said that she found it very strange to be a woman and feel afraid at a women's march. It struck us to see them debating whether or not they should go to the march on March 8, while being acutely aware that the people in their parties are anti-feminists, sometimes causing them shame.

Given these uncomfortable relationships, does it make sense to think about forming alliances with these young feminists? How could we approach them?

Melina: There are certain issues that could serve as common ground, especially the agenda addressing violence against women. Concerns about violence keep resurfacing. They take up the issue and reframe it within their own terms. They do not speak in the same terms or with the same public intensity, but the issue is there, and could be a potential topic of conversation.

Carolina: Audiences frequently ask us if it is possible to establish some kind of dialogue with these women. Our experience was quite exceptional: we, with our academic profiles and our "left-wing credentials", were able to talk to them and be heard, something that does not always happen. But at the same time, I believe that this question is based on an illusion of distance. These women are already among us: in our families, universities, schools, and neighbourhoods. They are not a distant "other." It may not be possible to articulate around all agendas, but it is possible to converge around some, such as violence, insecurity, or the economy. Among younger women, personal finances and economic autonomy appear to be key issues, and perhaps a bridge can be built from there.

Melina: Ultimately, we argue that we cannot think about contemporary political phenomena without incorporating the question of women. We thought that this was a settled matter, we realised that this perspective remained absent in research on the far right. Today's right wing not only includes women; it shapes, challenges, and provides them with spaces and a political language. The fact that some of them call themselves feminists compelled us to adopt a more nuanced perspective. We cannot dismiss them as pro-life religious fanatics because that overlooks the complexity and diversity of activism that the new far-right consolidates. Our book is an investigation and an invitation to continue applying a gender perspective to the study of contemporary political right-wing movements.

Melina Vázquez and Carolina Spataro: Sin padre, sin marido y sin estado. Feministas de las nuevas derechas (No Father, No Husband, No State: Feminists of the New Right), Argentina, Siglo XXI, 2025.